grievances surrounding urban land scarcity are, also in Bukavu, saturated with references to ethnicity and belonging.
Beall and Goodfellow hold "that when sovereign and civil wars come to an end, urbanbased violence in the form of civic conflict often increases." 11 Newcomers to Bukavu are regularly beaten up, financially extorted, socially excluded, chased from their newly acquired land and occasionally even killed.
In Bukavu's periphery, which absorbs the brunt of migrant arrivals, tensions between and within Congolese ethnic groups are expressed through the concept and privileges of 'autochthony', of having been there first. On the very local, neighborhood, level, claims to autochthony permeate civic conflicts. This paper examines how narratives of autochthony and belonging figure in and reconstruct land allocation mechanisms in a particular peripheral area in Bukavu called Kasha. It explores how the idioms used by both newcomers and autochthones draw boundaries affecting identity, access to urban land, and land governance. It also traces some features of the emergent and increasingly common ethnically homogenous urban clusters found in the city's periphery, which are often seen as a necessary protection against uncertain tenure and intimidation. With the framework of institutional hybridity, this paper then challenges analytically convenient binaries such as statutory-customary and formal-informal governance arrangements.
This paper uses the terms migrants and newcomers interchangeably to describe people who were recently forcefully displaced or (temporarily) migrated from particularly rural to urban areas within South Kivu. This definition is not sensitive to international borders.
Institutional hybridity and the leakage of meaning
In this paper practices relevant to urban land are represented through the framework of institutional hybridity. Description of the resource management and processes of urbanization land access," 13 "multiplicity of stakeholders," 14 "hybrid governance," 15 and "hybrid political orders" 16 to explain the diversity of venues through which land is managed and claimed. The framework has been developed by scholars specifically to support description of complex, everyday governance processes in often post-conflict or fragile state 17 contexts as more normative and functionalist frameworks encourage research and representations that are inappropriately binary, and compartmentalizing. 18 As mentioned by Büscher in the introduction of this special issue hybridity might help us to move beyond state-centrist accounts of political order. 19 It enables studies to overcome linear and essentialist features characteristic of political realist 20 governance analyses by encouraging researchers to identify the interweaving of state/formal and non-state/informal actors, mechanisms, and institutions. 21 Rather than a mere multiplicity of more traditionally conceived coherent institutions, 22 within the frame provided by hybridity institutions are understood in the first instance as the combination of different sets of rules of the game, often at odds with one another, coexisting in the same landscape. 23 Instead of being the exception, regime fluidity, contradicting power relations in which the state "waxes and wanes," 24 and citizens' negotiation of their position in pursuit of their goals is the norm. We, therefore, look at both institutions, the rules of the game, and the people who are making use of it. It is only in the interaction of people that we see institutional hybridity: both authorities as well as urban dwellers continuously influence the logic and use of (hybrid) institutions. The hybrid institutional landscape, then, differs depending on interaction and perceived identity of subjects (as we will see with land governance in Kasha).
With the lens of institutional hybridity we also seek to emphasize the discursive aspects of hybridity. In processes of hybridity boundaries do not only get blurred, but also meaning leaks from one institutional constellation to another. Lund makes the important remark that "the deluge of meaning underscores that many institutions are multi-purpose, and different institutions with different purposes overlap, intersect and become one another in different situations." 25 When using the concept of institutional hybridity we can, for instance, see how discourses of both statutory land laws and customary practices permeate interactions between urban dwellers competing over scarce land. Authorities, institutions, relationships, and identities are all continuously constructed and reconstructed in the imagination, expectation, and everyday practices of urban dwellers seeking to protect their access to and control over urban land. Resorting to discourse as an explanatory tool of hybridity is one particular strategy in stepping out of essentializing, realist claims. Examples of this kind of work can also be found with Bayart, 26 Schatzberg, 27 and Albrecht and Moe. 28 In this paper we trace the workings and (spatial) effects of the inflammatory, but equally flexible discourse of autochthony in justifying claims when securing land through a variety of dynamic institutions and loosely constructed governance arrangements.
Methodological considerations and obstacles
The data supporting this paper arose during ethnographic fieldwork conducted in three separate periods between 2011 and 2014. Data were gathered through one-off and sequential in-depth interviews with key authorities within Bukavu's state institutions as well as with current and former neighborhood chiefs and the customary leader of Kabare. In addition, data were gathered from approximately one hundred land occupants, both newcomers and original settlers living in Kasha, who were engaged both individually and then through the small groups that frequently appeared spontaneously to form around interviews irrespective of the privacy of their setting.
Interviews ranged from semi-structured to open conversations that, as appropriate, involved respondents' creation of graphic, cartographic, and artistic representations in the interview and having them interpret visual prompts brought to the interview by the researcher.
When groups were involved, particularly to identify shared and divergent understandings, researchers encouraged and made note of individual contributions and joint conclusions. In addition, researchers undertook participant observation within one of the city's land brigade (in which urban land disputes were evaluated and mediated), invited and secured personal diaries from urban chiefs, and had research assistants with locally relevant identities attempt to purchase land in order to better understand de facto procedures and discrimination.
Studies on land and access to land, especially in conflict settings, always touch on sensitive topics. They may produce disputes and certainly yield results that may be contested.
At the time of fieldwork, the region was burdened by the M23 crisis. Neighboring city Goma was under attack and was even briefly occupied. 29 This context of violence and uncertainty was referenced in the context of ethnic marking. In order to learn about the importance given to 'autochthony' and belonging in a manner that did not exacerbate existing grievances with regards to land and ethnicity, the study made use of three research assistants each of whom had a different ethnic background. These assistants never asked questions about ethnicity, they never used the term 'autochthony', and they did not actively follow-up ethnicizing responses in a manner that might encourage further polarization. In all cases the relevance of ethnicity was determined in analysis.
Linking territory and identity in South Kivu
In what we now call South Kivu, the most centralized pre-colonial political structure was the Shi chiefdom, headed by the customary king, the Mwami. 30 The Shi, or the Bashi community is still the largest ethnic group living in and around Bukavu. The city is surrounded by a territory called Kabare, which is traditionally administrated and inhabited mostly by sometimes mutually antagonistic Shi sub-clans, such as the Bashebeshe, the Banyamocha and the Bashinjahavu.
Vlassenroot argues that the most important aspect of the "Mwami's power was his control over access to productive land, which was regulated by a variety of social and political relations based on identity." 31 The Shi chiefdom was already organized around clan identity before the arrival of colonial authorities. During Belgian rule, existing customary power structures of the Shi were integrated and reorganized into administrative structures of the colony, which further consolidated the Mwami's dominance over land.
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Other ethnic communities in South Kivu, such as the Lega, Tembo, Havu, Bembe, Vira, and Fulero had a less hierarchical and much more flexible social organization, and consisted of loosely connected clan structures. 33 But also with these groups, the identity of the colonized was used by the colonial administration to insert its authority through the reformation of customary chiefdoms. While ethnic spaces originally had elastic boundaries, ethnic groups became spatially marked upon colonization 34 .
Today we find all these and other ethnicities crowded into Bukavu, including the territory, became managerially attached to the Bagira commune and thus the city of Bukavu.
Although incorporated into the city on paper, Kasha still fell under the rule and the customary law of the Mwami. Kasha had a status aparte officially called a 'scheduled area,' 40 Mathys and Büscher report on the demonstrations of a particular strand of inhabitants of Kitchanga, in North Kivu, who fought for a recognized 'city' status. 41 The populations of Kasha had, however, long tried to resist any form of formal inclusion into the city administration.
During the second Congo War, from 1998 to 2003, Kasha was a separate commune, referred to as 'urbano-rurale,' and had its own bourgmestre, the executive head of the commune, who was a great grandson of the first customary chief of Kasha. 42 Today, Kasha is, however, administratively attached to the Bagira commune. four neighborhoods are run by chiefs officially appointed by the administration of Bukavu.
However, also the newly installed chef de quartiers were nominated by the Mwami of Kabare.
These neighborhoods are called Chikonyi, Buholo, Chai (also written as Cahi), and Mulambula.
Except for the heavily urbanized area of Chai all other neighborhoods are led by chiefs who are related to the Mwami's royal family, consolidating ties with the Kabare chiefdom.
Kasha's institutional landscape
During interviews, former customary chiefs stated that the Mwami still manages Kasha. The Such transactions are not adequately understood on purely traditional or modern terms.
Rather, they appear to be an awkward mixture of the two. Throughout this paper we will see that transactions mix worlds in ways that exclude portions of the modern government apparatus.
In Kasha, the 'right' customary identity in the right places secures access to land. 46 In such situations, the non-autochthonous purchaser who pays on purchase has secured nothing: they are vulnerable to ongoing extortion and eviction as they lack access to both customary and state enforcement.
Controlling land through institutional hybridity
Newcomers mix civic and ethnic means in paying individuals who are simultaneously customary and civic authorities for a semblance of title to unalienable customary land. While these individuals may receive an 'act of sale' this document is of little value, though they received land from an authority. As recent arrivals from an outside ethnicity, they do not have standing in autochthonous kinship-based systems that regulate control over (urbanizing) land.
The only way for other-ethnic residents to obtain some security for their tenure is through state certification. What we see here is land governance that is in a state of constant intertwining. In Kasha the encroachment of the urban city in previously rural areas has created an uncertain mixture of land allocation mechanisms whose nuance falsify representation in terms of a clash or mixture of clearly bounded statutory and customary law. This hybridity has created uncertainty for both newcomers and multi-generational residents. In a city burdened by the consequences of war and endemic corruption, where there is fierce competition over land, where there are officially no new plots available, and where all tenure is violable, increased importance is given to a discourse that naturalizes claims to land: autochthony.
Autochthony and territory: the use of a flexible marker
In several neighborhoods of Kasha the Bashi community are at risk of losing their dominant position. The population is now enormously diverse. One urban chief in Kanoshe argued that in Kasha the autochthone population has now become a minority. According to him, the newcomers are there in much larger numbers.
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For self-proclaimed autochthones, migrants are a source of concern as they are perceived to harm their communities, further exacerbating their sense of tenure insecurity.
Migrants are regularly accused of building in inappropriate places, blamed for the inflation that has put the price of land beyond the reach of most autochthonous citizens, and for disrupting the intergenerational transfer of land. In these and other arguments, the language of autochthony links identity and place in a manner that produces a speaker, a son of the soil, whose preferential claim to land is both natural and inalienable. 49 The use of autochthony by any group is linked to naturalized differential inclusion with attendant rights and obligations.
Most recent migrants mentioned, unprompted, in interviews that they suffered discrimination, intimidation, and exclusion at the hands of the autochthone population.
Intimidation ranges from name calling, through taking (back) pieces of land and threatening to destroy a migrant's house, to the use of physical and occasionally lethal violence. One appeal of the autochthony discourse may be that the truths formed therein are utterly self-evident to those subjects who invoke it in extending claims. 50 In Bukavu, as anywhere else, ethnicity as a marker needs a history, a language and often a name referring to territory. Autochthony does not need any of this: merely the claim of being first. Geschiere and Jackson argue that "it is this very emptiness that seems to make it fit so well into constantly changing environments. The 'Other,' crucial to any form of identity, but especially to such fuzzy ones, can be easily redefined, precisely because autochthony has hardly any substance."
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Insofar as the truths of autochthony are self-evident and the conditions required to support those truths seem to be plastic, it would be a mistake to argue that 'autochthony' is only used to differentiate pre-existing ethnicities. Bøås explains that the protection of rights is argued through tales of origin in the form of story-telling about a collective we. This unit can be anything from the nuclear family to the lineage, the community, the ethnic group or several ethnic groups faced with perceived strangers. 52 The location of 'here', as discussed, depends on context.
Autochthones' justification of violence and discrimination.
While the subjective construction of mutual differentiators is far from new to Congolese ethnic groups, within, and perhaps especially among Shi-people, its invocation today, regarding access and control over urban land, solidifies differentiation within and between ethnic groups that may rapidly produce justifications to authorize conflict.
We encountered many reports of violent disputes between early and recent settlers, during which people where threatened with machetes, beaten up with sticks, pushed off steep hills, chased of their land, or found their houses to be destroyed. In a few cases disputes between newcomers and self-proclaimed autochthones ended with death. While the nature and extent of violence varied, the practices were consistently framed in terms of the self-evident right of the autochthone population. 56 Within autochthone framing, urban violence and practices of exclusion and eviction are not justified solely by reference to first presence. We can see the autochthony rationale prevailing in a variety of social interactions and governance arrangements. In addition to not being sons of the soil, migrants are recognized as engaging in behaviors that are unacceptable merely because they are non-autochthonous. Recently, there were too many cases of theft in the neighborhood. He was able to gather a team of young fathers who work during the day, but who want to protect their families at night. He explicitly added that everyone was welcome to join, but that he did not want newcomers or any other strangers. 58 According to him, and many others of this neighborhood watch, migrants are in fact part of the problem of today's insecurity in the entire city.
The conviction among self-proclaimed sons of the soil that migrants are thieves, or at least collaborate with thieves and bandits, is widespread in Kasha and interacts with similar ascriptions with respect to witchcraft and promiscuity. Newcomers, in this mode of representation, have caused land insecurity, physical insecurity, theft, moral corruption and sexual violence. Violence is synthetic to the discourse of autochthony in Kasha. The stories told of the 'Self' and 'Other' overlay representations of autochthone versus stranger and victim versus aggressor. 59 Within this language of autochthony, both those who came first and those who arrived last represent themselves as victims of their other. Both identify their other as liars, aggressive, and selfish. Such ascriptions are startling only for their lack of originality. The exact same patterns and characteristics are reported in Bøås on Liberia, 60 Hilgers on Burkina Faso, 61 and Landau on the city of Johannesburg.
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In order to further understand the land governance mechanisms in the periphery of Bukavu we will now further examine the spatial implications of ethnicized hybridity through which this, occasionally violent, discourse propagates.
Creating clusters on previously vacant land
Many newcomers have clustered in the periphery of Bukavu by village of origin. New arrivals look for earlier migrants from their own village. These helpful clusters, concomitantly, emphasize the lines dividing newcomers and self-proclaimed autochthones.
Living in so-called urban clusters is certainly not unique to Kasha. It is an adaptive reflex that can be found throughout the entire city. In the Nguba neighborhood, close to the 'Autochthony' becomes more prominent in conversations when approaching the borders of these clusters. In these areas one can find all manner of problems framed in terms of autochthony.
Migrants became suspicious and defensive when asked how people from the same village got to live so close to each other. This apparently innocuous question abruptly terminated more than one interview. For those that answered, the most common (and equally implausible) answer given was pure coincidence. Such reticence makes sense given respondents' reasonable fear that any slight irregularity found in their narrative may be used to evict them from land for which they have uncertain tenure. Their reluctance may also, in part, derive from interest in protecting their social protection, their fragile livelihood.
Governance of clusters and their safety nets
The re-constitution of a variety of state institutions by those who recognize autochthonous privilege changes their operation such that only autochthony shapes access. Perhaps in response to reduced access to local state or customary institutions, a patchwork of governance arrangements found in recent migrants' home villages emerge in clusters in Kasha formed by recent migrants the most basic of which is provision of familiar forms of social protection.
The practices of mutual protection arising in these clusters imbue everyday relations with forms of reciprocity that are negotiated on terms transposed from villages of origin rather than through acceptance of, for instance, the contracts, certified documents, assertion of legal rights, or exercises of financial penalties found in Kasha, their new home. 66 Other examples of transposed mechanisms arising in such clustering can be found in the city's active associations of newcomers in which membership is also based on origin.
In order to be recognized by (loosely constructed) governance arrangements arising in these clusters, migrants must participate in social meetings such as births, weddings, mourning gatherings, and funerals. These events provide the occasion for sharing useful information, for the acts of respect that constitute all parties and for the provision (as able) and receipt (as needed) of support from fellows. Missing these ostensibly social events comes at considerable social penalty and, at times, such normatively compelled participation imposes costs that border on the extortionate. While the autochthone community may resent these imported governance arrangements, such customary governance is also practiced by the autochthone community of Kasha.
Recent migrants do not simply transplant social safety nets from the village. As explained by a In clusters of newcomers, the first to have arrived facilitates settling of those who follow. They provide and, with the Mashi saying that "people accept as rulers those who can provide and dispense to them material gains," those who arrive first are often recognized by those who follow as a leader of their cluster. 71 What we see here is that clustering similarly has an impact on the way newcomers inscribe themselves into forms of urban governance. But, yet again, a form of urban governance which does not necessarily lead to strict and secure statutory land title as interaction with local government is often avoided.
Defending clusters from 'the other'
There are several levels of authorities in Bukavu. At the neighborhood level there is the chef de quartier, the chef de cellule, the chef d'avenue and lastly, the chief of ten houses or in Swahili:
Nyumba Kumi. All other chiefs are given a French name except this last one who is generally referred to with its Swahili title. Uniquely, the chief of ten houses is chosen by residents in those houses. When new people arrive they roughly count the houses and choose a new chief of ten houses. In clusters of newcomers they logically select a chief from their own origin. This position is mostly ceremonial but can reduce intimidation and distortion as they talk directly to higher order chiefs and they can help cover new buildings. In this manner new arrivals may patch themselves and their governance arrangements into urban government.
Clusters of newcomers, furthermore, preserve their status through ensuring that when residences in the cluster become empty, that they are filled by people from their own village.
In Kasha the same happens within the autochthonous population and, not surprisingly, the sale and rental of houses only rarely happens openly and only rarely involved state authorities (with whom they are legally obliged to register both sales agreements and change in occupation).
Such closed transfers have, at times, frustrated chefs de quartier and higher state authorities such as the bourgmestre of Bagira, who asserted in interviews that he has the right to receive money from every newcomer and, in particular, those who build a house.
Autochthones are seen to, and, in interviews where it was mentioned often confirm, that they prefer ethnically or clan pure neighborhoods where they can 'respect' their customs of land heritance in order to secure their claims to (urbanizing) land and where social relations are not eroded by the presence of 'others'. 72 Yet autochthone perceptions and claims to land are no longer mirrored in land management practices of the Mwami of Kabare. Currently, the selfproclaimed autochthonous population in urbanizing Kasha is reinterpreting ancestral rights, which are no longer purely practiced as such, as they bear on land title. In many interviews autochthones mentioned, inconsistent with tradition, that land assigned to them by custom was theirs forever. 
State sanctioned autochthony
To this point self-proclaimed autochthones in Kasha have mostly been presented as being concerned by the pressure on urban land created by migrants. Autochthones also seem to be concerned by the encroachment of statutory land allocation mechanisms. Migrants' occasional use of state institutions, simultaneously, brings agents of those institutions into areas inhabited by a mixture of non-autochthones and autochthones. This makes unregistered land visible to state institutions and state institutions visible to autochthones who hold customary but not statutory title. As such, every time a purchaser registers land at the Office of Land Registry, the Division of Housing, or even the Communal Office in Bagira, the insecurity of tenure of nearby land that has not been registered increases.
Urbanization does not mean that all Bukaviens will shift to statutory means to obtain and secure title. The evolving ethnicized hybridity described above is echoed at higher levels.
To provide one example we will briefly look at a land dispute which highlights an encounter between state sanctioned and customary claims to land. Three parties were involved in this land dispute. Two Shi men from Walungu, who were already living in town for around a decade but who are not considered autochthones, bought two plots close to the city's brewery, in the northern part of Kasha in Chikonye. They had both asked surveyors of Land Registry to come and measure the land. They resorted to the office of Land Registry in order to inspect their land because they had a conflict with a neighbor who had lived on his adjacent plot for his entire precisely that: markers. They act as signifiers whose social relevance is conditioned by the identity of the individual with whom they are associated. Where rags worn by an outsider predict tenure insecurity, the same rags worn by an insider of the correct identity predicts tenure security.
In the example of land dispute just discussed, we find that what looks like, from the outside, to be a state institution is ambivalent with respect to its own normative institutional framework. 74 It is not strictly illegal to distribute land under customary law. Yet, this alleged autochthonous land owner did not possess any papers, statutory or customary, linking him to his land. Land allocation can, according to law, not be privileged on the basis of customary positions and their attendant identities (also in court an act of sale with the date of purchase need to be presented when other forms of registration or certified documents are unavailable).
State officials in Bukavu act in manners that are not purely civil. Their navigation and negotiation of their own identity and 'rules', as found in this and many other examples, evidence constant dialogue with the institutions that attend those who seek access to and control over land. This dialogue is, however, heavily influenced by the narrative of autochthony.
Once more, it turns out to be problematic to draw lines between statutory and customary land mechanisms in peri-urban Bukavu. In Kasha they are variously mixed. There is leakage of meaning between authorities and their practices. And there are, it seems, no static binaries other than those found in analytically convenient representation. Practice is better understood as an ever evolving mixture of land governance mechanisms. That said, the 'statutory' -'customary' division constituted within the autochthony narrative ought not be discarded. The pluralism found in Kasha, is complex, contradictory and constantly shifting. While it may, indeed, not be defensible to describe practices in terms of static binaries, the rhetoric of autochthony is pervasive. In Kasha, no one seems to escape the influence of (the idea of) the state nor do they escape influence of (the idea of) tribalism and ethnic lineages. This has sustained or, perhaps, even enforced a situation in Kasha in which state agents are actively involved with, or otherwise provide tacit permission for, self-proclaimed autochthones to abuse their allochthone neighbors.
Conclusion: ethnicized hybridity in Kasha's land administration
Beall and Goodfellow already stated that "there is no simple relationship between civil war and cities in Africa." 75 The two Congolese wars and the incessant fighting of several rebel groups in the two Kivu provinces certainly had an effect on the urbanization of Bukavu. While conflict should certainly not be mistaken as the ultimate cause of rapid urbanization of Bukavu's periphery, it has contributed to its ethnicized character.
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In Kasha, the rapid encroachment of the urban city, accompanied by rampant corruption, partial state failure, as well as the interpenetration, mutual transformation and constant negotiation of ideologies and practices of land allocation mechanisms are both cause and consequence of the reification of ethnic boundaries which are functional to dangerous narratives around autochthony. In this crucible, the local government of Bukavu has been unable to cope with issues that are clearly within its mandate, such as the allocation of tenure, the delivery of services, and the maintenance of some semblance of security.
The "rural exodus" is publicly marked by politicians and administrators as a burden and/or a threat to the city's development, while privately exploited by these same administrators for profit. In this context where notions of 'statutory' and 'customary' land allocation are, descriptively, little more than quaint anachronisms functional in other discourses, state offices staffed by autochthones compete for the authority to deliver ownership certificates. All of these dynamics, set against a history of war, displacement, state instability and familial bonds, facilitates a dialectic between extortive discrimination and mutual assurance whose only unifying moment may be dangerous reification of ethnically marked social division.
While ethnic markers and the discourse of autochthony are certainly not the only aspects influencing the spatiality of Kasha, practices recognized by outsiders as institutional hybridity are increasingly more pliably mobilized and infused with rhetoric and practices of autochthony 
